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I. INTRODUCTION
"If an ox gore a man or woman, and they die, he shall be
stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten." Exodus 21:28
Forfeiture has its roots in biblical times. The common law followed
with the view that property used to cause the death of a King's subject was
forfeited to the King. The King would convert the property to a charitable
use. Forfeiture later became a source of Crown revenue. America adopted
forfeiture with a proliferation of in rem and in personam statutes designed
both to punish the offender and to take contraband property from the care-
less property owner.1 Although Florida has both in personam and in rem
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I. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). In Calero-
Toledo, the Supreme Court approved forfeiture of a yacht worth over $100,000 because it
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statutes, this article is limited to in rem forfeitures pursuant to the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act, sections 932.701 through 932.707 of the Florida
Statutes.
It is inherently just and proper that the vehicle used as the getaway car
in an armed robbery be taken from the robber for subsequent use by the
sheriff to provide road patrol protection for the public. This is called
contraband forfeiture, which is a great concept. In practice, however,
forfeiture threatens due process because an in rem forfeiture is not limited
to vehicles owned by the criminal. Furthermore, neither an arrest nor a
conviction is required for, or relevant to, forfeiture proceedings.2 The legal
fiction that the vehicle is the offender eliminates the need for a conviction.
Originally, in federal courts, innocence of the vehicle owner was not a
defense to forfeiture, even if the owner was not present or did not otherwise
know of the crime. To prevent forfeiture, the innocent owner had to prove
that the vehicle was stolen from him by the robber, or that he had done all
that reasonably could be expected to prevent the use of his vehicle in the
robbery.3
Prior to 1980, Florida had a limited, weak, ineffective and seldom used
forfeiture statute.4  Three times in the past thirteen years the Florida
Legislature made substantial changes to forfeiture law. In 1980, Florida
made a serious entry into the forfeiture arena with the enactment of The
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.5 Prior law applied only to vessels,
motor vehicles, and aircrafts, and forfeited only those items used in commit-
ting crimes related to drugs, gambling, beverage or tobacco laws, and motor
contained one marijuana cigarette. Id. The owner, Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., had no
knowledge of the violation. Id. at 663, 690.
2. City of Tallahassee v. One Yellow 1979 Fiat 2-Door Sedan, 414 So. 2d 1100, 1101-
02 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
3. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90. The Calero-Toledo Court stated:
It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the constitutional
claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from
him without his privity or consent. Similarly, the same might be said of an
owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the
wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance,
it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and
was not unduly oppressive.
Id. (citations omitted).
4. See FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-943.44 (Supp. 1974) (Florida Uniform Contraband
Transportation Act) (renumbered at FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-932.704 (1981)).
5. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-943.44 (Supp. 1980).
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fuel tax violations. 6 The 1974 to 1980 law was further limited by courts to
apply only in "drug trafficking operations." '7  The 1980 amendments
expanded forfeiture to any personal property, including currency, used in
any felony.8 The new law shifted the burden of proof from the state or
agency to the property owner. 9
Incentive for law enforcement and attorneys to use the Contraband
Forfeiture Act of 1980 was provided by allowing the seizing agency to use
funds from the sale of property forfeited and by allowing agencies to use
their own or outside counsel to file the action.'" Formerly, proceeds from
sold property went into the general revenue fund of the municipality or
county, and only the often reluctant State Attorney could file the action."
In 1989, the Act was amended to add real property used "to facilitate
the transportation, carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession,
purchase, s;ale, barter, exchange, or giving away of any contraband
article."' 2 It is obvious that forfeiture of real estate that is used to conduct
a ten dollar crack cocaine sale or to store over twenty grams of marijuana
substantially increased the value of potential forfeitures. The 1989
amendments also added proceeds from the sale of contraband property and
provided that other property of the defendant could be forfeited if the
contraband property was sold or otherwise gone prior to seizure. 3
Since 1980, Florida law enforcement agencies have benefitted by the
forfeiture of currency and property, valued in many millions of dollars.
However, the use of the forfeiture law has not been without detractors in
both the courts and public domain. Forfeitures are considered harsh
exactions and they are not favored in law or equity. '4 They are strictly
construed against the government. 1" Justice Barkett, Chief Justice of the
Florida Supreme Court, described the authority granted to law enforcement
by the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act as "awesome."' 6 Judge Glick-
6. FLA. STAT. § 943.42 (1979) (renumbered at FLA. STAT. § 732.702 (1981)).
7. See, e.g., Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1978).
8. FLA. STAT. § 943.41(e) (1980) (emphasis added) (renumbered at FLA. STAT. §
932.701(e) (1981)).
9. Id. § 943.43 (renumbered at FLA. STAT. § 732.703 (1980)).
10. Id. § 943.44(1) (renumbered at FLA. STAT. § 732.704 (1980)); id § 943.44(3)(a)
(renumbered at FLA. STAT. § 732.704(3)(a) (1980)).
11. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 943.44(5) (1979).
12. FLA. STAT. § 932.702(3) (1989).
13. Id. § 932.703(1).
14. Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 1991).
15. In re Forfeiture of $91,357.12, 595 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
16. hi re Forfeiture of 1969 Piper Navajo, 592 So. 2d 233, 236 (Fla. 1992).
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stein of the Fourth District Court of Appeal termed forfeiture a "draconian
remedy" in a stinging dissent to a majority opinion that upheld the forfeiture
of an aircraft used in a registration felony and owned by a "player in the
Noriega trial because of reported drug smuggling activities."17  Judge
Glickstein was greatly influenced by the series of newspaper articles in the
Stuart News and the Pittsburgh Press entitled "Presumed Guilty," which he
adopted in great detail in an unusual "Epilogue to Dissent."' 8  Other
Florida newspapers have attacked the forfeiture law by describing it as an
apparently unjust and excessive use of the law against "innocents."' 9
It is against this background of judicial and public negativity that the
Florida Legislature made its third substantial alteration of forfeiture law.
Our lawmakers were aided by the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property.2° The court held the
1989 Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act to be constitutional but only by its
interpretation that the statute included substantive and procedural safeguards
that were not in the wording of the Act.2' In July of 1992, the Florida
Legislature substantially adopted the requirements of the Department of Law
Enforcement opinion by enacting Florida Session Laws chapter 92-54.22
This survey of Florida law necessarily starts with the 1991 Department
of Law Enforcement v. Real Property decision and the July 1992 amend-
ments to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. The decision and the
amendments substantially changed the law affecting several important legal
issues in forfeiture.
II. DUE PROCESS-JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION
After holding that the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act was facially
constitutional in Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property,23 a case
of first impression, the Florida Supreme Court explained that the Act was
applied with minimum due process requirements, but not found in the
17. In re Forfeiture of One 1980 Cessna, 587 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (Glickstein, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 556-58.
19. See, e.g., Profit in the Name of the Law, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 10-14, 1991. This
was a week-long series of articles by several authors critical of the forfeiture law.
20. 588 So. 2d at 957.
21. Id.
22. Ch. 92-54, 1992 Fla. Laws 500 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-932.707 (Supp.
1992)).
23. 588 So. 2d at 957.
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wording of the act that were specified in the opinion.24 The forfeiture
action was initiated by the seizure of 480 acres of land that included an
airstrip, a mobile home subdivision, a restaurant, a bath house, a personal
residence, garages and other improvements by the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement ("FDLE"). FDLE filed a forfeiture petition seeking to
forfeit the property on the grounds that it was used for drug trafficking.
Based upon the affidavit of a FDLE agent, the circuit court issued warrants
to seize the property. The FDLE filed notice of lis pendens the same day.
The 1989 Act did not provide for the filing of an affidavit, the issuing of a
"seizure" warrant, or the filing of a notice of lis pendens. The claimants,
property owners, moved to dismiss the petitions. The circuit court
dismissed the action on two grounds.25 First, the Act failed to provide
substantive due process. 6 Second, it was void for vagueness because it
required "parties to guess the proper procedures and protections" and
required insufficient notice as to what specific property was subject to
forfeiture.27
The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction from the First District
Court of Appeal to decide a matter of great public importance that required
immediate resolution. 2' The court acknowledged that the Act "does not set
out any procedures for filing the petition or issuing the rule to show cause,
except that a rule shall issue upon the showing of 'due proof. 29  Prior
district court opinions characterized forfeiture proceedings as "procedural
quagmires"':"° and "murky."3I The Fifth District Court of Appeal stated
that "the Forfeiture Statute leaves much to the judicial imagination in
guaranteeing procedural due process ....32
In deciding the issue of whether The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act
comports with substantive and procedural due process of law, the Florida
Supreme Court recognized that it must resolve the conflict between the
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 957.
29. Id. at 966.
30. Id.; see In re Forfeiture of $5300, 429 So. 2d 800, 801-02 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App..
1983).
31. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 966; see One 1978 Green Datsun
Pickup Truck v. State ex rel. Manatee County, 457 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
32. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Charles, 606 So. 2d-750, 751
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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principle that forfeiture statutes are strictly construed and not favored in law
or equity, and the traditional judicial policy that all doubts as to the validity
of a statute are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality where reasonably
possible.33 The court recognized its rule making powers but cautioned that
it could not legislate and violate the separation of powers prohibition.34
The court resolved that it could require the missing safeguards by relying
on the procedures set forth in prior case law and thus construe the Act to
comport with minimal due process requirements.35 Thereafter, Florida's
high court vociferously legislated several substantial changes to the Act.
The following fourteen requirements were added to the 1989 Act by the
opinion. Each is followed by the provision added to the 1992 Act that
corresponds to and adopts the Florida Supreme Court opinion:
1. Immediately after ex-parte seizure of personal property for
forfeiture, the seizing agency must notify all interested parties that
the property has been taken and that they have the right to request
a post seizure adversarial preliminary hearing. The hearing is
"anticipated" to be within 10 days of any such request.36
1992 Statute: "Personal property may be seized at the time of the
violation or subsequent to the violation, provided that the person
entitled to notice is notified at the time of the seizure or by
certified mail, return receipt requested, that there is a right to an
adversarial preliminary hearing after the seizure to determine
whether probable cause exists to believe that such property has
been or is being used in violation of the Florida Contraband
Forfeiture Act . . . . it shall be held within 10 days after the
request or as soon as practicable. 37
2. Prior to any initial restraint of real property other than lis pendens,
the seizing agency must provide notice of and schedule an
adversarial hearing for interested parties. The petition for
forfeiture and recording of notice of the petition (lis pendens)
33. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 961.
34. Id. at 961-62; see FLA CONST. art. I, § 3.
35. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 959.
36. Id. at 965-66.
37. FLA. STAT. § 931.703(2)(a) (Supp. 1992).
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should be filed simultaneously. The hearing is anticipated to be
within 10 days of filing the petition.3"
1992 Statute: "Real property may not be seized or restrained,
other than by lis pendens, subsequent to a violation of the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act until the persons entitled to notice are
afforded the opportunity to attend the preseizure adversarial
preliminary hearing.... [T]he pre-seizure adversarial preliminary
hearing provided herein shall be held within 10 days of the filing
of the ]is pendens or as soon as practicable.
39
3. The agency seeking forfeiture may file its complaint by applying
to the circuit court for issuance of a rule to show cause.4
1992 Statute: "The seizing agency shall promptly proceed against
the contraband article by filing a complaint in the circuit court
within the jurisdiction where the seizure or the offense oc-
curred."'"
4. The "petition" must be verified and supported by verified affida-
vit.41
1992 Statute: "The complaint shall be styled, 'In RE: FORFEI-
TURE OF ' (followed by the name or description of the
property). The complaint shall contain a brief jurisdictional
statement, a description of the subject matter of the proceeding,
and a statement of the facts sufficient to state a cause of action
that would support a final judgment of forfeiture. The complaint
must be accompanied by a verified supporting affidavit. ' 43
5. The court shall sign and issue a rule to show cause if it ex-parte
determines that the petition on its face states a cause of action.
38. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 965.
39. FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2)(b) (Supp. 1992).
40. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
41. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(4) (Supp. 1992). The 1992 Act eliminated the "Rule to Show
Cause" language and requirement.
42. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
43. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(5)(a) (Supp. 1992).
44. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
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1992 Statute: "If no person entitled to notice requests an ad-
versarial preliminary hearing, as provided in s. 932.703(2)(a), the
court, upon receipt of the complaint, shall review the complaint
and the verified supporting affidavit to determine whether there
was probable cause for the seizure. Upon a finding of probable
cause, the court shall enter an order showing the probable cause
finding."45
6. A copy of the petition and the rule shall be served on all persons
the agency knows or should know have a legal interest in the
property.46
1992 Statute: "If the property is required by law to be titled or
registered, or if the owner of the property is known in fact to the
seizing agency, or if the seized property is subject to a perfected
security interest in accordance with the Uniform Commercial
Code, chapter 679, the attorney for the seizing agency shall serve
notice of the forfeiture complaint by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to each person having such security interest in the
property. 47
7. The rule to show cause shall require that responsive pleadings and
affirmative defenses be filed within twenty days of service of the
rule to show cause.48
1992 Statute: "The court shall require any claimant who desires
to contest the forfeiture to file and serve upon the attorney
representing the seizing agency any responsive pleadings and
affirmative defenses within 20 days after receipt of the complaint
and probable cause finding.,
49
45. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(5)(b) (Supp. 1992). The "Order" replaces the former
requirement of a "Rule to Show Cause."
46. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
47. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(6)(a) (Supp. 1992).
48. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
49. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(5)(c) (Supp. 1992).
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8. "The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure shall otherwise control
service of process, discovery, and other administration of forfei-
ture proceedings." 5
1992 Statute: "The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern
forfeiture proceedings under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act
unless otherwise specified under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture
Act."51
9. Forfeiture is decided by a jury trial unless the claimants waive that
right. 2
1992 Statute: "Any trial on the ultimate issue of forfeiture shall
be decided by a jury, unless such right is waived by the claimant
through a written waiver or on the record before the court
conducting the forfeiture proceeding."53
10. The seizing agency has the burden of establishing probable cause
at the adversary preliminary hearing. 4
1992 Statute: " 'Adversarial preliminary hearing' means a hearing
in which the seizing agency is required to establish probable cause
that the property subject to forfeiture was used in violation of the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. 55
11. At trial, the seizing agency has the burden of establishing by clear
and convincing evidence that the property has been used in
violation of the forfeiture statute. "Due proof" in the statute
means by clear and convincing evidence. 6
1992 Statute: "Upon clear and convincing evidence that the
contraband article was being used in violation of the Florida
50. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
51. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(2) (Supp. 1992).
52. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
53. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(3) (Supp. 1992); see In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van,
493 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986).
54. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 966.
55. FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
56. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967-68.
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Contraband Forfeiture Act, the court shall order the seized
property forfeited to the seizing law enforcement agency."57
12. At trial the claimant (owner) has the burden of establishing by the
preponderance of the evidence the defense of lack of knowledge
that the property was used in criminal activity."
1992 Statute: "No property shall be forfeited under the provisions
of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act if the owner of such
property establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he
neither knew, nor should have known after a reasonable inquiry,
that such property was being employed or was likely to be
employed in criminal activity."59
13. If probable cause is found during an adversarial preliminary
hearing, the court must order the property restrained by the least
restrictive means that will protect against disposal. Restraining
order, property bond and notice of lis pendens were suggested.6"
1992 Statute: "If the court determines that probable cause exists
to believe that such property has been, is being, or was attempted
to be used in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act,
the court shall order the property restrained by the least restrictive
means to protect against disposal, waste, or continued illegal use
of such property pending disposition of the forfeiture proceed-
ing."1
6 1
14. "Forfeiture must be limited to the property or the portion thereof
that was used in the crime. 62 The court does not discuss the
reasoning for this potentially devastating limitation on real
property forfeiture. Although the trial court listed vagueness as
one of the reasons for finding the act violates due process because
the act does not require "what specific property is subject to
57. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(8) (Supp. 1992). The term "due proof' was eliminated from
the Act.
58. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 968.
59. FLA. STAT. § 932.703(6)(a) (Supp. 1992).
60. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 964-65.
61. FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2)(d) (Supp. 1992).
62. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 968.
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forfeiture,"63 there is no other discussion of the reason or mean-
ing of this limitation in the Florida Supreme Court opinion.
1992 Statute: The legislature ignored this limitation. Section
932.701(2)(a)(6) expanded the definition of real property as
contraband to include "any right, title, leasehold, or other interest
in the whole of any lot or tract of land, which was used ... in the
commission of ... any felony .... "
III. OTHER STATUTORY CHANGES AND ADDITIONS: 1992
In addition to adopting the requirements of the Department of Law
Enforcement opinion, the 1992 Legislature made the following significant
changes and additions to the Act:
I. The 1992 Act added a policy statement:
It is the policy of this state that law enforcement agencies
shall utilize the provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfei-
ture Act to deter and prevent the continued use of contraband
articles for criminal purposes while protecting the proprietary
interests of innocent owners and lienholders and to authorize
such law enforcement agencies to use the proceeds collected
under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act as supplemental
funding for authorized purposes."
2. "Promptly proceed" or time to file the complaint from the date of
seizure was reduced from ninety days to forty-five days.66
3. "Complaint" is now defined as "a petition for forfeiture in the
civil division of the circuit court ... ."" The former Act did
not specify the original pleading to be a "complaint" or a "peti-
tion." As noted earlier in this article, the court in Department of
Law Enforcement found that the agency "may file its complaint"
63. Id. al 959.
64. FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(a)(6) (Supp. 1992).
65. Id. § 932.704(1).
66. Id. § 932.701(2)(c).
67. Id. § 932.701(2)(d).
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and then "the petition must be verified."68  Since the Act now
defines complaint as a petition, it is apparently proper to call the
initial pleading a petition.
4. The party with proprietary interest in the property is designated as
a "claimant."69  Litigants and courts, including the Florida
Supreme Court, had often referred to interested parties as "defen-
dants" despite the in rem nature of the proceedings.
5. Use of seized property by the seizing agency is prohibited until
title is perfected. Operation for maintenance is permitted only to
minimize loss of value.7 ° This was in reaction to media cover-
age that was critical of police using vehicles and other seized
property prior to obtaining a final order of forfeiture.
6. Vehicle rental or leasing companies are now specifically excluded
from forfeiture if the claimants establish that they neither knew
nor should have known the vehicle was used in criminal activi-
ty.7 Claimants do not have the added burden of reasonable
inquiry imposed on other innocent owners and lienholders. They
also have the right to immediate possession.72
7. Innocent co-owners other than spouses have the same protection
as other innocent owners up to the value of their interest in the
property. Co-owner spouses retain the right to defeat the forfei-
ture entirely if they make the requisite showing of no knowledge
and reasonable inquiry.73
8. The "attempt" to use property in violation of the Act was added
to the definition of "contraband article," i.e., real and personal
68. See supra notes 40, 42 and accompanying text.
69. FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(h) (Supp. 1992).
70. Id. § 932.703(1)(c).
71. Id. § 932.703(6)(d).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 932.703(7). This amendment was to conform the Act to In re Forfeiture of
1985 Ford Pick-Up Truck, 598 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1992), which held that the interest of
innocent co-owners must be protected in order to construe the statute in a constitutional
manner. In November 1992, in a forfeiture case brought under the Florida RICO Act, the
Florida Supreme Court held that forfeiture of homestead property is forbidden under article
X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution. Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992).
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property that may be subjected to forfeiture.74 Formerly, at-
tempted use was not sufficient.
9. Settlements made prior to conclusion of the forfeiture proceeding
must be approved by the court, a mediator, or an arbitrator unless
waived by the claimant in writing.75 This was also in response
to media publicity of some prior claimants who settled pre-trial
and then complained they were coerced or "extorted" into paying
money to the agency to avoid the delay and cost of litigation. It
is expected that forfeiture litigation will continue to be settled pre-
trial as any other civil litigation, and that the settlement will now
include the required waiver.
10. If the claimant prevails at trial, any decision to appeal must be
made by "the chief administrative official of the seizing agency."
If the claimant prevails on appeal, the court may require the
agency to pay the claimant lost income and lost value of the
seized property if the seizing agency retained the property during
the appeal.76
11. If the claimant prevails at trial, the court may award reasonable
attorney fees and costs if it finds the agency did not proceed in
good faith or the action was a gross abuse of the agency's
discretion.77
12. The 1992 Act retained the agency right to use or sell forfeited
property and retained the contraband forfeiture "law enforcement
trust fund" for deposit of currency and proceeds from sale. The
Act established priority in payment of liens (where lienholders
established their "innocent" defense), storage, maintenance,
security, forfeiture costs and court costs. Remaining funds may,
as before, be used by the agency, upon approval of the governing
body, for law enforcement purposes, but not for "normal operating
needs of the law enforcement agency." Fifteen percent of trust
funds over $15,000 annually must be donated to drug treatment,
74. FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(a) (Supp. 1992).
75. Id. § 932.704(7).
76. Id. § 932.704(9)(b); see In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer, 546 So.
2d 1083 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989), affid, 576 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1990).
77. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(10) (Supp. 1992).
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abuse education and prevention, crime prevention, safe neighbor-
hood, or school resource programs. Reporting requirements by
the agencies to the Department of Law Enforcement and the
Legislature were changed and specified in the 1992 Act.78
13. The 1992 Act requires training of law enforcement officers in the
area of seizure and forfeiture of property. Training is to begin by
October 1, 1993. 79
14. Strength was added to the previously largely ignored reporting
requirement by the addition of penalties of up to $5000 against
agencies that fail to comply.8°
15. The 1992 Act became effective July 1, 1992."
IV. CASE LAW, JULY 1992 TO JULY 1993
A. Burden and Standard of Proof-Sufficiency of Evidence
In In re Forfeiture of 1987 Chevrolet,82 a son used his mother's
vehicle to commit a felony. The trial court found that the mother "did not
use reasonable care to see that her son did not use the car for criminal
purposes."83 Accordingly, the court held that the agency failed to meet the
statutory requirement of actual or constructive knowledge that property was
employed or likely to be employed in criminal activity.84 The statute does
not provide a defense for effort to prevent use although such evidence or
lack of same may be relevant in proving constructive knowledge.85
Application of the Department of Law Enforcement standard of proof
was made in Fink v. Holt.86 Martin County Sheriffs Deputies chased a
doctor for three miles until he crashed his 1985 Chevrolet Corvette.
Deputies found a partially smoked marijuana cigarette on the driver's seat
78. Id. § 932.7055 (tentatively renumbered at § 932.7055).
79. Id. § 932.706.
80. Id. § 932.707.
81. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, ch. 92-54, § 11, 1992 Fla. Laws 500, 513.
82. 605 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
83. Id. at 1323.
84. Id.
85. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
86. 609 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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and several controlled substances that were not in marked containers in his
briefcase. Possession of controlled drugs without a prescription or without
labels are both felonies in Florida. The Sheriff initiated forfeiture proceed-
ings against the Corvette. The doctor contested the forfeiture on grounds
that no crime was committed because, as a doctor, he was privileged to
possess the unlabeled drugs. The trial court found that there was probable
cause to seize the vehicle under the totality of circumstances. 7 On appeal,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not establish
probable cause because the Sheriff failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence accorded to a physician that possession of schedule II substances
is in the normal course of practice."8 "We do not believe that the mere
presence in a physician's un- or mislabeled containers is enough to suggest
that the physician is not using the schedule II drug 'in the usual course of
[his] business or profession' or 'in good faith and in the course of profes-
sional practice."'8 9 Further, the district court held that the trial court erred
in using the probable cause standard.9" Relying on Department of Law
Enforcement, the court found that the Sheriffs proof was "at best in equi-
poise" and does not establish the Sheriffs entitlement to forfeiture by clear
and convincing evidence.9'
The City of Deland appealed a trial court's directed verdict in a
forfeiture action against $301 and a 1979 Ford van in City of Deland v.
Miller.92 City police seized the van and cash after observing the owner
transport stolen property in the van. The only evidence to support forfeiture
of the cash was that the owner acquired the money through his television
and stereo business from which he had not reported sales for the months of
June through September, 1990, to the Department of Revenue.93 The trial
court did not permit this evidence and entered a directed verdict. The Fifth
District Court of Appeal affirmed as to the cash but reversed and remanded
as to the van, noting that it was undisputed that stolen property was
transported in the van and that the owner admitted the identity of the van
in pleadings and joint pre-trial compliance.94
87. Id. at 1335.
88. Id. at 1336.
89. Id. (citations omitted).
90. Id.
91. Fink, 609 So. 2d at 1337.
92. 608 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
93. Id. at 122.
94. Id.
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In Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Charles,95 the
Florida Highway Patrol had probable cause to believe $39,390 was intended
to be used to purchase drugs (contraband) where they stopped a Chevy
pickup truck that was southbound on 1-95 in Volusia County and the cash
was found under a tarpaulin in a metal can stacked in bundles secured by
different colored rubber bands. A baggie with marijuana was also found in
the can. The three men in the van denied ownership of the money and
knowledge of how it got in the truck. A K-9 drug-trained dog alerted
positive to the presence of narcotics on the truck seat, the metal can and a
separate baggie of cash found in one of the men's pockets. Troopers gave
expert opinions regarding the method of packaging money and the notoriety
of Miami, Florida as a center for drug smuggling and as a source of
supply.96 Two of the truck occupants had prior drug crime records.
Valium prescribed to another person was found in the coat pocket of one of
the occupants and he gave two conflicting accounts of how it got into his
pocket. The truck and occupants were from Kentucky. On this evidence,
the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
forfeiture and found probable cause did exist based upon "the totality of the
circumstances."97 The court cautioned that upon remand the department
must show grounds for forfeiture by clear and convincing evidence pursuant
to Department of Law Enforcement.98
In a case that gives no facts other than that the trial court forfeited
jewelry worn by a person during a drug sale, the First District in Jenkins v.
City of Pensacola99 reversed and remanded for entry of an order dismissing
the forfeiture.' ° The reversal was based upon the Department of Law
Enforcement clear and convincing standard.'' It is difficult, however, by
any standard to imagine how the drug dealer used jewelry worn by him as
an instrumentality in the crime or in aiding or abetting the crime. Perhaps
the "jewelry" was a watch and he looked at it to verify the appointed time
for the drug sale thus establishing a nexus between the watch and the crime.
95. 606 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
96. Id. at 752. In a footnote, the court said "Regrettably Miami, Florida, has achieved
a degree of notoriety for being a center for drug smuggling and a source of supply." Id. at
n.4 (citing United States v. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d 895 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1056 (1986)).
97. Id. at 754.
98. Id. at 751; see Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 755.
99. 602 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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In re Forfeiture of $8489"02 was another reversal of forfeiture, based
upon Department of Law Enforcement. The Second District Court of
Appeal questioned whether the "clear and convincing" standard of proof will
result in greater protection for Floridians or will just result in forfeiture
cases being filed in federal court where the standard of proof remains by the
preponderance." 3 Judge Altenbernd wrote the opinion questioning the
value of the new standard in a case where $8489 was forfeited by the trial
court upon evidence that the currency was found in a home pursuant to
execution of a search warrant that also produced eight and one-half pounds
of marijuana, a triple beam scale and other paraphernalia common for drug
sellers.0 4 The district court reversed and remanded for a new hearing to
consider the evidence in light of the higher standard.0 5 Certainly the
evidence in this case provided probable cause and, under pre-Department of
Law Enforcement law, the claimant had the burden to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the currency was not drug money. On remand, the
agency has the burden to prove it was drug money by clear and convincing
evidence. Given that most similar cases are based solely upon the
circumstances, it appears many of these cases may not rise to the level of
clear and convincing proof.
The positive alert of a trained drug dog has long been sufficient to
supply probable cause to search cars and arrest persons.'0 6 This rule,
however, was questioned by Third District Court of Appeal Judge Ferguson
in a concurring opinion of Metro-Dade Police Department of Dade County
v. Hildalgo.'o7 Judge Ferguson opined that an alert by a drug dog coupled
with association with a criminal suspect supplied only "founded suspicion"
and not "probable cause" to seize a vehicle for forfeiture.0 8
Where claimants, who were in a 1986 Ford truck, picked up two minor
females who had solicited a ride, and took them to a place where they had
illegal sexual activity, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the use
of the truck was only incidental to the crime and accordingly it was not
subject to forfeiture.0 9  The men, however, then drove the females
102. 603 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
103. Id. at 98.
104. Id. at 97.
105. Id. at 98.
106. See In re Forfeiture of $62,200, 531 So. 2d 352, 356 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
107. 601 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming forfeiture dismissal on
other grounds).
108. Id. at 1261 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
109. In re Forfeiture of 1986 Ford PU, 619 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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looking for a motel and ended up staying overnight where one of the men
lived and there further illegal felony sex occurred. The court held that this
second incident was sufficient to provide a nexus between the illegal acts
and use of the truck to transport the girls to the scene of the crime."'
Forfeiture of the truck was affirmed because it was used in the second
incident to aid the commission of a felony by transporting the parties to the
scene. I "
B. Ownership-Standing
An important question of standing was clarified by the Florida Supreme
Court in Byrom v Gallagher."' An aircraft was seized as contraband after
it had been used illegally and sold but prior to the Federal Aviation
Administration's recording of the bill of sale. Since the prior owner was the
"registered" owner at the time of seizure, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
denied standing to Byrom who was the registered owner at the time of the
forfeiture hearing." 3 In reaffirming a prior decision, the Florida Supreme
Court held that "[t]he fact that a person is a bona fide purchaser in itself is
not adequate to give a party standing.""' 4  However, in prior cases, the
party making a claim in the forfeiture was not the registered owner at the
time of the forfeiture. The court decided to allow Byrom and future
claimants to establish standing if they prove the additional element that they
were bona fide purchasers." 5
Consequently, in determining whether a person has standing the trial
judge should consider: 1) whether that person holds legal title at the
time of the forfeiture hearing or has complied with the requirements for
receiving title; and 2) whether that person is in fact a bona fide
purchaser. The trial judge should consider the facts surrounding the sale
to determine whether the transfer is in fact a bona fide purchase. The
relationship of the parties, the date the instruments were executed, the
value of the property, the sale price, and canceled checks or bank
deposits to show actual payment and receipt of money are all factors
which the trial court should consider in determining whether the transfer
110. Id. at 339-40.
Il. Id.
112. 609 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1992).
113. Id. at 24-25 (citing Byrom v. Gallagher, 578 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1990)).
114. Byrom, 609 So. 2d at 26 (citing Lamar v. Wheels Unlimited, Inc., 513 So. 2d 135
(Fla. 1987)).
115. Id. at 27.
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is a bona fide purchase. This list is not intended to be exhaustive but
rather illustrative of the consideration to be made by the trial judge. In
making the determination whether a title holder is also a bona fide
purchaser, the trial judge should be able to sift the wheat from the
chaff.' 16
The sword cut from the other side on the titled owner principle of
standing in forfeiture in In re Forfeiture of 1987 Chevrolet."7 The court
rejected the: contention that the son who used a 1987 Chevrolet titled to his
innocent mother was the "de facto" owner.' It was again held that the
term owner in section 932.703(2) "is limited to one who has obtained a title
certificate . *...""' The final order of forfeiture was reversed because the
trial court made no finding that the mother had the requisite knowledge that
her son used the vehicle in a felony. 21
Without reference to its holding in the previous case, and without
reference to, but probably because of, Byrom,' the First District inexpli-
cably cited Department of Law Enforcement to support its holding that the
presumption of title by co-ownership of a motor vehicle can be overcome
by clear and convincing evidence. 2 2 In this case, the court held that the
pickup truck titled to a father and son jointly was not a true co-ownership
and the innocent father had no standing because he was only a nominal
owner. 23 The district court remanded for a new hearing on the issue of
the father's interest under a clear and convincing standard. 24 The case is
in a hopeless legal morass. Standing must be shown by the claimant not the
agency. "[O]nly persons who have standing can participate in a judicial
proceeding.'25  Furthermore, "standing is limited only to those persons
who can show a recorded title or compliance with the requirements for
116. Id. at 26-27. The court also noted that this requirement for standing is limited to
property where the state requires a title or compliance with title requirements to show
ownership. Id. at 27 n.3. In other types of property, a party would only have to show he
or she is a bona fide purchaser. Id.
117. 605 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
118. Id. at 1323.
119. Id. (citing Lamar, 513 So. 2d at 137).
120. Id. at 1325.
121. Byrom, 609 So. 2d at 24.
122. In re Forfeiture of 1989 Isuzu Pickup Truck, 612 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
123. Id. at 697.
124. Id.
125. Byrom, 609 So. 2d at 26 (citation omitted).
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receiving title."'26 The First District has remanded with directions for the
trial court to require the wrong party to establish standing by the wrong
standard of proofl The case should have been remanded with instructions
to follow Byrom.
C. Notice Requirements
In State Department of Natural Resources v. 62 Ft. White De Vries Len
Ketch Sailboat,'27 the trial court dismissed a forfeiture for failure to give
notice of right to a post seizure hearing where the agency had sent notice of
the seizure prior to Department of Law Enforcement but did not send a
supplemental notice advising of the right to post seizure hearing.'28 The
Third District reversed, holding that Department of Law Enforcement did not
require a supplemental notice and even if it did, the omission was harmless
since claimant knew of the right and did not request a hearing.129 In
another case, where there was no notice at all, the Third District held that
the notice requirement was not grounds for reversal because the seizure was
prior to Department of Law Enforcement.3' The district court also held
that neither the statute nor Department of Law Enforcement requires a
warrant, consent or exigent circumstances to seize property for forfei-
ture. '3 In a decision handed down this year, without citing Department
of Law Enforcement, the Fifth District reversed a forfeiture of a co-owners
interest in a 1973 Trojan boat because the rule to show cause was not
directed to that co-owner and the sheriff failed to comply with the notice
provisions of the forfeiture statute.
32
V. CONCLUSION
Since 1980, Florida contraband forfeiture law has been a dynamic force
in the courts and in the Legislature. The use of forfeiture has gone from
virtual nonoccurrence to a peak. More recently, the laws regarding
126. Id.
127. 617 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
128. Id. at 774-75.
129. Id. at 775.
130. In re Forfeiture of 1986 Ford PU, 619 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
131. Id. at 338.
132. Blanchard v. Osceola County Sheriff's Office, 618 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
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forfeiture have been redefined and limited to avoid unduly oppressive results
against innocent owners.
Although federal statutes and the United State Supreme Court have
permitted forfeiture of contraband property from innocent owners,1
3
Florida has; always had innocent owner protection in it's forfeiture law.'34
Despite this protection, because forfeitures are not favored by the courts and
are absolutely loathed by the fourth estate, the Florida Supreme Court and
the Legislature have reacted by imposing numerous additional due process
requirements since 1991.' The 1992 amendments to the Act finally
provided a procedural framework that was not in the original 1980 Act, an
omission that caused much confusion and misunderstanding in the interven-
ing twelve years.
Forfeiture will continue to be a useful vehicle to punish offending
property owners and convert criminal assets to good public use. However,
with the new clear and convincing standard of proof, forfeitures will have
to be supported by stronger proof of illegal use. It is the foremost desire of
the author that law enforcement agencies act responsibly and with great
discretion in continuing to use this awesome law. The goose that laid the
golden egg in 1980 was seriously wounded by the few excessive applica-
tions, the media exposure and the court and legislative response. Hopefully,
the goose will fully recover and resume its productive life.
133. E.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (forfeiture
of a yacht worth over $100,000 because it contained one marijuana cigarette even though the
owner had no knowledge of the violation).
134. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-943.44 (Supp. 1974) (Florida Uniform Contraband
Transportation Act) (renumbered at FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-932.704 (1981)).
135. Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991);
FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-932.707 (Supp. 1992).
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